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APPELLEE'S BRIEF AND
CROSS-APPELLANT'S BRIEF

Case No. 930162-CA
Priority No. 15

APPELLEE'S BRIEF
JURISDICTIONAL AUTHORITY
Jurisdiction is vested with the Court of Appeals pursuant to
Utah Code Annotated § 78-2a-3 (2) (i) (1992).
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
The issues presented by Defendant/Appellant for review are as
follows:
1.

Did

the Trial

Court err when

it concluded

that the

marital residence of the parties was a marital asset after finding
that the funds to purchase the residence were derived from comingled funds in an account accessed by the Defendant alone despite
Defendant's testimony that he had kept funds separated and had made
ongoing mortgage payments from a pre-marital retirement account?

The applicable standard of review for this issue is the "clear
abuse of discretion" standard as stated in Kerr

v.

Kerr,

610 P.2d

1380, 1382 (Utah 1980).
2.

Did the Trial Court err when it ordered the marital

residence sold and the assets divided equally between the parties,
and when it granted Plaintiff possession of the marital residence
pending sale?
The applicable standard of review for this issue is
the "clear abuse of discretion" standard as stated in Kerr

v.

Kerr,

610 P.2d 1380, 1382 (Utah 1980).
3.

Did the Trial Court err when it ordered the 1988 Jaguar

automobile

sold

and

the proceeds

divided

equally

between

the

parties despite Defendant's claim of a pre-marital interest in it?
The

applicable

standard

of

review

for

testing

the

Trial

Court's factual finding is the "clearly erroneous" standard as
stated in Hagan v.

Hagan,

810 P.2d 478,481 (Utah App. 1991).

The applicable standard of review for the issue of property
distribution is the "clear abuse of discretion" standard as stated
in Kerr
4.

v.

Kerr,

610 P.2d 1380, 1382 (Utah 1980).

Did the Trial Court err when it awarded the Porsche

automobile to Plaintiff as pre-marital property despite Defendant
claiming a marital interest in it due to marital funds being used
to repair or refurbish it?
The

applicable

standard

of

review

for

testing

the

Trial

Court's factual finding is the "clearly erroneous" standard as
stated in Hagan v.

Hagan,

810 P.2d 478,481 (Utah App. 1991).
2

The applicable standard of review for the issue of property
distribution is the "clear abuse of discretion" standard as stated
in Kerr

v.

Kerr,

5.

610 P.2d 1380, 1382 (Utah 1980).

Did the Trial Court err when it affixed the value of the

Defendant's retirement account (401k salaries savings plan) at the
value on the date of trial and simultaneously declined to adopt
California law concerning division of the asset when Defendant had
not

challenged

repeatedly

Utah

asserted

jurisdiction,
Utah

residency

and

where

during

all

Defendant

had

stages

the

of

proceedings.
The

applicable

standard

of

review

for

testing

the

Trial

Court's factual finding is the "clearly erroneous" standard as
stated in Hagan v.
The
Court's

Hagan,

applicable
application

810 P.2d 478,481 (Utah App. 1991).

standard
of

the

standard as stated in Maxwell

of

review

law
v.

is the
Maxwell,

for

testing

"correction

the
of

Trial
error"

796 P.2d 403 (Utah App.

1990) giving no deference to the trial court.
6.

Did the Trial Court err when

automobile

sold

and

the proceeds

it ordered

divided

equally

the

Blazer

between

the

parties despite testimony that the vehicle had decreased in value
between the date of separation and trial?
The

applicable

standard

of

review

for

testing

the

Trial

Court's factual finding is the "clearly erroneous" standard as
stated in Hagan v.

Hagan,

810 P.2d 478,481 (Utah App. 1991).

3

The applicable standard of review for the issue of property
distribution is the "clear abuse of discretion" standard as stated
in Kerr

v.

7.

Kerr,

610 P.2d 1380, 1382 (Utah 1980).

Did the Trial Court err when it did not order Plaintiff

to repay funds taken as salary from the marital business during the
pendency of this action?
The applicable standard of review for the issue of property
distribution is the "clear abuse of discretion" standard as stated
in Kerr

v.

8.
to

Kerr,

610 P.2d 1380, 1382 (Utah 1980).

Did the Trial Court err when it did not order Plaintiff

compensate

Defendant

for

damage

to

his

firearms

despite

Defendant's testimony that Plaintiff's son had caused the damage
and that the firearms were in the physical possession of Plaintiff
during the pendency of this action?
The applicable standard of review for the issue of property
distribution is the "clear abuse of discretion" standard as stated
in Kerr

v.

9.
child

Kerr,

610 P.2d 1380, 1382 (Utah 1980).

Did the Trail Court err when it declined to designate

support arrearages

from Plaintiff's prior marriage as a

marital asset?
The
Court's

applicable
application

standard
of

the

standard as stated in Maxwell

of

review

law
v.

is the
Maxwell,

for

"correction

the
of

Trial
error"

796 P.2d 403 (Utah App.

1990) giving no deference to the trial court.

4

testing

The applicable standard of review for the issue of property
distribution is the "clear abuse of discretion" standard as stated
in Kerr

v.

10.

Kerr,

610 P.2d 1380, 1382 (Utah 1980)•

Did the Trial Court err when it did not order that credit

card debt incurred by Defendant be paid from business income or
from the proceeds of the sale of the business?
The applicable standard of review for the issue of property
distribution is the "clear abuse of discretion" standard as stated
in Kerr
11.

v.

Kerr,

610 P.2d 1380, 1382 (Utah 1980).

Did the Trial Court err when

it found

Defendant

in

contempt of court.
The

applicable

standard

of

review

for

testing

the

Trial

Court's factual finding is the "clearly erroneous" standard as
stated in Hagan v.

Hagan,

810 P.2d 478,481 (Utah App. 1991).

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES,
RULES, AND REGULATIONS
Utah Code Annotated §30-3-5
Utah Code Annotated §78-2a-3(2)(i)
Utah Code Annotated §78-32-1
STATEMENT OP THE CASE
After a violent incident of spouse abuse, Plaintiff filed her
complaint for divorce on May 5, 1992. (R. at 2) 1 From the outset
the case has been hotly contested as evidenced by the numerous
hearings to dispose of motions and enforce temporary court orders.
(R. at 42, 46-48, 78-83, 128-130, 135-146).

On August 12, 1992,

throughout the brief the literal lfRff will stand for Record of
the case and the literal "T" will stand for the transcript of the
trial. The numbers following the literals will indicate the page
where the material referenced can be located.
5

the court conducted a scheduling conference• (R. at 63) . Trial was
conducted on December 3, 4, and 10, 1992. (R. at 268).

On the

final day of trial, and after the Judge had reviewed substantial
personal notes of the trial, over 60 exhibits and pertinent case
law, the trial court gave oral findings of fact, conclusions of law
and decree of divorce from the bench. (R. at 737 et. seg.).
Each party submitted a written version of proposed findings,
conclusions and decree.

Defendant filed a motion for rehearing on

January 13, 1993 which was denied.

(R. at 283, 290). Other post-

trial motions were filed which were all resolved in conformity with
findings of fact, conclusions of law and the decree of divorce
signed and entered February 19, 1993. (R. at 359-382).

The court

further disposed of any post-trial issues when, on March 31, 1993,
the court signed its own Order doing so. That Order was entered on
April 1, 1993.

(R. at 406-411).

On March 16, 1993, Defendant filed his Notice of Appeal.
at 392) .

(R.

Later, Defendant filed a docketing statement together

with an Amended Notice of Appeal seeking to challenge the court's
disposition

of

post-trial

conclusions and decree.

motions

(R. at 474) .

as

well

as

its

findings,

Plaintiff timely filed her

Notice of Appeal and Docketing Statement as well.
At the trial, the parties each advanced the position that the
Defendant's

retirement

account

guidelines established in Woodward

be

divided

v. Woodward,

pursuant

to

the

656 P. 2d 431 (Utah

1982) , and that a Qualified Domestic Relations Order should be
entered.
6

The Court denied Plaintiff's request for alimony.
total income was established as $1,150 per month.

Plaintiff's

Of that amount,

$1,000 was compensation from the business owned by the parties at
the time of their separation.

The court ordered that asset be sold

but failed to consider the loss of income to Plaintiff which would
certainly result at the time of the sale.
Evidence

and

testimony

also

established

that

Defendant

currently earned a salary in excess of $65,600 per year working at
Lockheed over and above his airforce retirement of $14,000 per year
(T. at 663) making his total income approximately $6,638 per month.
(T. at

663; see

also

Exhibit

16

(1991 Form

1040

income

tax

return)).
The Court also denied Plaintiff's request for attorney fees.
Testimony

concerning

attorney

fees presented

by way of cross-

examined testimony (T. at 244- 246; 438-443) was un-rebutted.

The

Court failed to make any finding with regard to the reasonableness
of the fee, (T. at 762) , the absence of which is fatal and suggests
that a remand of this case may be appropriate

for additional

findings and the possible award of attorney fees. Muir v. Muir,

841

P.2d 736, 741-742 (Utah App. 1992).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The parties were married on August 17, 1985.
485).

This was a second marriage for each party.

(R. at 2; T. at
(T. at 85 and

417) .
Each party brought pre-marital assets to the marriage, and the
parties acquired assets during the marriage.
7

Some assets were

acquired from the proceeds of pre-marital assets.

Specifically,

the proceeds from the sale of each of their prior homes became the
focus of much testimony at trial.

Defendant's prior home was

located in Mission Hills, California, and Plaintiff's prior home
was located in Agua Dulce, California.
Testimony at trial was contradictory when attempts were made
to

trace

marriage.
separate

the proceeds
Defendant
while

from

the

sale

of

maintained

that

the

Plaintiff

testified

each

home

proceeds

that

the

after

the

were

kept

proceeds

were

commingled and controlled solely by Defendant.
Plaintiff's prior husband was ordered to pay child support for
their minor child but failed to do so.

(T. at 200).

Plaintiff's prior husband filed bankruptcy.
Defendant

alleged

that

in

effect

Ultimately,

(T. at 535, 630) .

Plaintiff's

arrearage

claim

against her prior spouse would amount to $64,250.00 and that he had
in effect provided that amount in support since he had provided for
the minor child throughout the marriage. (T. at 379) .

Defendant

urged the court to consider the arrearage amount as a marital asset
when making the final property distribution.
ruled otherwise.

(T. at 738).

The parties eventually moved to Utah.
and a business.

The court found and

They purchased a home

Testimony was contradictory as to what funds were

used to make the purchases.

The Trial Court found and concluded

that commingled funds were used to make the purchases (T. at 750)
and that the assets were marital property.

8

The court ordered the

home and the business sold and the proceeds divided equally (T. at
749,750).
Defendant continued to work in California, returning by car at
least weekly to Utah.

Defendant eventually purchased an airplane

to reduce his commuting time.

(T. at 634).

Defendant asserted Utah residence throughout the proceedings
in the court below.

(T. at 738).

But, at trial, Defendant

asserted that California law ought to govern the distribution of
his 401K salaried savings plan since he was earning his salary in
California.

The Trial Court rejected his legal argument.

(T. at

738) .
During

the

pendency

of

the

proceedings,

Defendant received an IRS income tax refund.

Plaintiff

and

The check was mailed

to Defendant, and although a joint refund, was cashed by Defendant
alone and held by him alone.

Defendant had used some portion of

the refund to pay for accounting fees and hanger fees for his
airplane.

(T. at 594).

The balance was held in his own account

(T. at 651) despite the court having ordered it to be used for the
expenses of the Sportsman's Lounge.

Ultimately, when Defendant

made a motion for rehearing and other post-trial motions, the court
learned that Defendant had still not complied with the court's
prior orders concerning the use of the refund and found him in
contempt.

(R. at 406-411).

The property division directed by the Trial Court attempted to
return pre-marital property to each party, and divide the marital

9

estate equally.

Defendant contends that the court erred in this

approach to the division with respect to a few items.
Plaintiff was unemployed during the majority of the marriage.
After

the parties separated,

Plaintiff

has been able to earn

$1,000.00 per month from her work at the marital business, and $150
per month from another part-time job.

Due to the relatively new

financial condition of the business attributable to the efforts of
the Plaintiff, it is uncertain whether the business will sustain an
income to Plaintiff at this present level.

At any rate, the

business has been ordered sold, and the $1,000.00 per month income
will no longer be available to Plaintiff.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Plaintiff argues that the judgment of the trial court as to
property distribution should be affirmed.

Plaintiff argues that

the judgment of the trial court as to alimony and attorney fees
should be reversed.
Plaintiff asserts that the marital residence was a marital
asset because the trial court correctly found that the funds used
for the purchase of that asset were commingled from premarital
assets of each party.
marital asset.

Likewise, the Sportsman's Lounge

is a

The trial court correctly ordered these marital

assets sold and the proceeds divided evenly.

There is adequate

testimony, evidence, and specific findings to support such a result
and

the

court

did

not

abuse

its

disposition.

10

discretion

in

making

the

The other
included

claims of Defendant

in this

appeal

simply

to

are without merit
vex

and

harass

and are

Plaintiff.

Plaintiff asserts the correctness of the trial court's award of
other items of personal property.

To wit:

(1) The 1988 Jaguar automobile which was a marital asset
because it was purchased from the proceeds of commingled funds (an
equity loan against the marital residence);
(2) The Porsche automobile which Plaintiff owned prior to
marriage. This result is correct despite Defendant's claim that he
made

repairs

and

enhanced

the

value

of

the

automobile,

when

testimony was presented to demonstrate that he was reimbursed for
the repairs made;
(3)

That

Utah

law

should

apply

to

distribution

of

the

Defendant's 401K retirement plan earned during the marriage, and
that the court correctly applied Utah law rather than California
law;
(4) The blazer automobile was properly valued on the date of
trial, it having been found to be a marital asset;
(5) The trial court acted properly when it did not require
Plaintiff to repay the salary she had drawn from the business when
she demonstrated a full accounting for the funds so taken, and
because she single-handedly worked daily to preserve the marital
asset

and

earn

a

positive

cash

flow.

Had

the

court

ruled

otherwise, it would inequitable to take earnings from Plaintiff and
award them to Defendant

It would amount to unjust enrichment;

11

(6) The evidence was so weak that Plaintiff's minor child
damaged Defendant's firearms that the court did not compensate
Defendant

for

the

loss he

alone

Such

self-serving

testimony is often overlooked by the trier of fact.

That is the

trial court judge's determination.

claimed.

Plaintiff asserts that even if

the trial court failed to consider the claim, it does not amount to
a reversible error;
(7) The trial court correctly refused to consider unpaid child
support from a prior spouse as a marital asset.
provides

Defendant with a cause of action

substituted

child

support

he

provided.

The case law

for recovering
If

the

court

is

the
to

reconsider this issue, the law is clear that the "asset" belongs to
Defendant, and Plaintiff should be compensated for that advantage
in the distribution of marital assets;
(8) Defendant
discretion.
compensation

argues

that

It is supposed to.
for

paying

personal bank card.

his

the trial

court

exercised

its

The court did not award Defendant

airplane

expenses

charged

on

his

The court was justified in doing so because of

its broad discretion.

Defendant maintained the bank card, charged

on it during the separation period and the court declined to award
compensation to Defendant. A claim that the trial court abused its
discretion cannot be sustained under the evidence; and
(9) Because Defendant repeatedly defied court orders when he
in fact was capable of compliance but simply refused to comply, was
sufficient grounds to justify a contempt finding.
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ARGUMENT
I.

THE MARITAL RESIDENCE WAS A MARITAL ASSET
HAVING BEEN PURCHASED BY COMMINGLED FUNDS

At trial, each party maintained opposing views and testimony
concerning the source of funds used to purchase the home and
business

located

in Cedar

City, Utah.

evidence as required by Heslop

v.

A marshalling

Bank of Utah,

of

the

839 P.2d 828 (Utah

1992) shows that Plaintiff testified that she believed the funds
for the purchase of the home came from a joint bank account (T. at
53).

Plaintiff did not have a separate bank account (T. at 53) .
Marjorie Young, a witness, testified that at the time she and

her husband sold the residence to the Smiths, she believed that
they were selling it to "Richard and Lynda together."
301).

(T. at 299-

Exhibit 8 is the earnest money sales agreement.

It bears

both Richard (Defendant) and Lynda's (Plaintiff) signatures.
Defendant testified that the parties' original intention was
to move to Utah and that they in fact did sign the earnest money
sales agreement as husband and wife.
of

Plaintiff's

prior

spouse

But, owing to the bankruptcy

Plaintiff

transaction due to her poor credit rating.

was

excluded

(T. at 537).

from

the

Defendant

testified further that he had agreed with Plaintiff to
"put my house up for sale, take the profit from my house,
take it to the house in Agua Dulce, fix it up. . . . Put
a pool in, landscape it, sell it and move to a place that
we both wanted to reside in California." (T. at 535).
Next, Defendant testified that when the Agua Dulce home sold,
they realized $101,000.00 proceeds.
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(T. at 586). Defendant was

paid with one check and he deposited it in his savings account.
(T. at 587).
Plaintiff's

Exhibit

10

is the deposit

receipt

$100,542.55 balance in that account after the deposit.

showing

a

The court

could have reasonably concluded that the $542.55 was a pre-existing
balance in as much as the amount did not coincide with Defendant's
testimony.
In testifying about what happened to those funds, Defendant
said:
"Lynda and I sat down, and we went over the $100,000 that
we had. We had been pretty financially strapped. I was
paying for the motor home. I asked her if we could pay
that off. That was a little over $5,000. There was a
couple of other things that we cleared up bill-wise that
we had acquired during the time that we were financially
strapped, and we paid off a few bills." (T. at 587-588).
I ultimately took $60,000 and put that in a joint
account, and I had — I think I put $2 0,000 back into my
account to offset the monthly payments I had made and
some other things that I had done.
Q.
All right. And you say $55,000.00 was paid down.
What happened to the other $5,000 that was put into an
account?
A.
We used that to open the —
the inventory of the bar.

the checking account for

Q.
So what happened to the balance, then, of the funds
realized upon sale of that home?
A.
Over the following year, every time the Sportsmens
Lounge or my wife came to me and said, "I need more
money," I would take that out of my savings account and
write her a check to be put in the Sportsmens Lounge
account. (T. at 588)(emphasis added).
This

testimony

demonstrates

that

Defendant

had

exclusive

control over the funds and that the funds were used for business
14

and

other

purposes

incident

to

the

marriage.

There

are

no

identifiable funds remaining from the proceeds of the sale of the
Agua Dulce home.
On

cross

(T. at 588).

examination

the Defendant

gave

a more

detailed

accounting of the funds received from the sale of the Agua Dulce
home:
A.

It was issued to me in my name.

Q.

And where was it deposited?

A.
Initially I put it in the only savings account I
had. And at Lynda's request, I put that money in a joint
savings account.
Q.

Did your account already have your funds in it?

A.
I took everything out of that account when I
initially put that money in there.
The deposit slip
shows $1,100 — or one thousand — a hundred thousand one
— I'll get it right. $101,000 in there. (T. at 660,
661) .
Defendant's testimony was inconsistent with Exhibit 10 and
Plaintiff's testimony.

Continuing Defendant's testimony:

Q.
You testified , I believe, that $55,000 of that
money was used for down payment on the lounge; is that
correct?
A.

I believe so.

Q.
. . . And would you just restate the disposition of
the remaining $45,000.
A.
Well, an additional $5,000 went into the start-up of
the business. An additional $5,000 went to my wife at
some point in time. $5,000 went to VFW; $5,000 went to
pay off the motor home.
. . .
I had approximately
$18,000 when we started the bar, and I put that back into
the bar.
Q.

How much went to the motor home? . . .
15

A.
A little over — I think I owed like $6,200 to pay
it off. My payments were pretty steep. . . .1 paid it
off.
. . . Well, I think that's about everything I did
with it. I put some money in my account. And the reason
I did that is because I had — I paid off all the loans
I had borrowed against that house in Agua Dulce when it
was quit-claimed to me.
I still had some outstanding bills, and I had been
making monthly payments on those things that wasn't
accounted for, and we sat down — I went through that
ledger — I had to pay my son-in-law money. I had bought
all kinds of things to refurbish that house in Agua
Dulce. (T. at 661, 662).
The exhibits reveal that the earnest money sales agreement
bore both signatures (Exhibit 8 ) , but from the closing the final
deed bears only Defendant's signature (Exhibit 6 ) .
Mr. Murie testified that the bank wanted Mrs. Smith to sign a
waiver (waiver of interest) form at the closing.

(T.

at 544) .

But, he could not remember if it was in fact signed or not.

(T. at

544).

And, if it was not signed the loan would not close.

(T. at

548) .

He also testified that such a document would be in three

places after the closing, "in the title company's office, the
courthouse, and the brokerage. . . " where he used to work. (T. at
547).

Further, that it would not be possible for someone to gain

access to the documents after the closing to alter them.
547).

(T. at

It is significant to note the document was not produced at

the trial despite significant efforts to locate it by both parties.
The applicable law is found in Burt

v.

Burt,

799 P. 2d 1166

(Utah App. 1990) . There the court stated the steps that the trial
court

should

division.

follow

in

determining

an

appropriate

property

First, the trial court should "properly categorize the

property as part of the marital estate or as the separate property
16

of one or the other. "2 Burt,

at 1172.

Second, the court should

"consider the existence of exceptional circumstances and, if any be
shown, proceed to an equitable distribution
circumstances. . .
been done, the

." Id.

final step

in light of those

And finally, those two steps having
is to consider

"whether,

following

appropriate divisions of the property, one party or the other is
entitled to alimony." Id.
The Court of Appeals further explained that separate property
could properly be considered part of the marital estate "where the
parties had

inextricably

commingled

the property

with

property so that it lost its separate character." Burt,

marital
at 1169

(citations omitted).
The

trial

court

commented

at

the

time

it

announced

its

findings that as to marital property there was a "lot of disputed
testimony."

(T. at

744).

The

court determined

the marital

residence to be an asset of the marital estate, and found that the
funds used to purchase the asset had indeed been commingled, and
that since the parties each received their premarital home proceeds
during the marriage it would be inequitable to award a pre-marital
interest

to

one

party

over

the

other

when

each

contributed pre-marital assets for the acquisition.

party

had

(T. at 750) .3

2

The Court states "Each party is presumed to be entitled to all
of his or her separate property and fifty percent of the marital
property." Id.
3

The court stated: "While the defendant unilaterally placed
his home — his name, excuse me, on the Cedar City home, the Court
finds that the property was purchased during the time of the
marriage.
Each party lived in the home.
The plaintiff
continuously, and the defendant on weekends. And all of the real
17

Then the court ordered the assets sold and the proceeds divided
equally.
followed the Burt

The Trial Court correctly

requirements.

Further, the trial court did not make a clearly erroneous factual
finding.

The court considered the weight of the evidence before it

and ruled accordingly.
the evidence.
Hagan,

Its finding is sufficiently supported by

The court did not commit reversible error. Hagan

v.

810 P.2d 478,481 (Utah App. 1991).
II.

THE EQUAL DIVISION OP THE MARITAL
RESIDENCE
PROCEEDS FROM SALE IS AN EQUITABLE DIVISION OF THE
ASSET.
As discussed in the previous section, the Trial Court was

faced with the evidence that the funds used to purchase the marital
residence had been commingled, that premarital proceeds came to
each

party

during

the marriage, that

Defendant

had

exclusive

control over the funds and the court concluded that the asset was
a marital asset.
court

next

moved

(T. at 750, 751). Under the Burt
to

consider

the

existence

analysis, the
of

exceptional

property purchased in Cedar City should be treated as marital
property. To treat the plaintiff's $100,000 home sale proceeds as
commingled assets and then turn around and treat the Defendant's
$46,000 home sale proceeds as separate property may be what the
defendant alone planned but would not be equitable and isn't
justified under the — under the evidence as I see it.
No signed waiver has been produced, but even — even with the
asset being just in his name, I believe both parties had — and the
Court finds each party owned a premarital home.
Each party
received the proceeds from their premarital home after this
marriage. The plaintiff in the amount of $100,000 in October of
'90, and the defendant in the amount of $46,000 in June of 1988.
The assets were commingled. Each party shared in the use of the
proceeds, and in fact the $100,000 of hers, she testifies went in
an account with only his name on it. I view that as a — as a
commingling of the assets." (T. at 750, 751).
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circumstances and then, if found, proceed to make an equitable
division.
In

assessing

whether

or

not

there

were

exceptional
Heslop

circumstances, a marshalling of the evidence as required by
v.

Bank

of

Utah,

839 P.2d 828 (Utah 1992) reveals that there may

indeed have been exceptional

circumstances

in this case.

As

discussed in the previous section, Plaintiff and Defendant each
received premarital proceeds from the sale of their prior homes
during the marriage.

The funds were deposited into Defendant's

account with his name alone on the account.
commingled and commonly used between them.
assets during the marriage.
proceeded under Burt

The

funds were

Each party used the

(T. at 750, 751).

The court then

to make an equitable distribution.

In so

proceeding, the Court did not abuse its discretion.
III. THE 1988 JAGUAR IS RIGHTFULLY CONSIDERED A MARITAL
ASSET AND WAS RIGHTFULLY ORDERED SOLD AND THE
PROCEEDS DIVIDED EVENLY.
At trial, the court had testimony before it that some premarital funds were used for a down payment on a 1984 Corvette, that
the vehicle was sold and funds from a home equity loan advance were
combined with the proceeds from the Corvette sale to purchase the
1988 Jaguar, (T. at 554, 559, 560).

The trial court established

that the home was a marital asset, there having been commingling of
funds used for its purchase.

(T. at 750, 751).

There is no pre-

marital interest remaining in the automobile because the proceeds
used for purchase were commingled from other marital assets.

Any

use of the home in the transaction amounts to further commingling
19

of assets.

Property may appropriately be considered part of the

marital estate where the parties have inextricably commingled the
property with marital property so that it has lost its separate
character.

Burt

v.

Burt,

799 P.2d 1166, 1169 (Utah App. 1990).

Although the court heard testimony that the 1984 Corvette was
purchased as a gift for Plaintiff (T. at 175, 400) and Defendant's
daughter testified it was not a gift for Plaintiff (T. at 476) it
could conclude that this testimony was irrelevant in light of the
commingling.

It could as well conclude that Plaintiff's testimony

was the more credible testimony

and could

then disregard

the

testimony of Defendant's daughter.
The court had before it sufficient evidence to support the
court's finding that the asset was a marital asset and thus its
finding was not clearly erroneous.

Conflicting testimony is often

encountered at trial and the trial court must judge the credibility
and weight each testimony would receive.

Yelderman

v.

Yelderman,

669 P.2d 406, 408 (Utah 1983).
The court did not clearly abuse its discretion in ordering the
vehicle sold and the proceeds divided equally between the parties
when it had already determined the home to be a marital asset.
Once the home achieved marital status due to commingling, the asset
and proceeds thereof would maintain a marital characterization.
The fact that Defendant claims to have used the asset [home used as
collateral] for his own purchases, does not make the asset his sole
and separate or premarital property.
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IV.

THE PORSCHE AUTOMOBILE WAS A PRE-MARITAL ASSET
RIGHTFULLY RETURNED TO PLAINTIFF IN THE PROPERTY
DIVISION. DEFENDANT IS NOT ENTITLED TO OFFSET FOR
REPAIR BILLS HE PAID.

Testimony at trial was undisputed that the Porsche automobile
was a pre-marital asset belonging to Plaintiff.

(T. at 179). It

was rightfully returned to her in the property division since the
trial court made no findings as to any exceptional circumstances to
over-ride the presumptive rule of Burt
(Utah App. 1990); see also Hall

v.

v. Burt,

Hall,

799 P. 2d 1166, 1172

219 Utah Adv. Rep. 29, 30

(Utah Ct. App. August 10, 1993).
During the marriage repairs were made which exceed the present
value of the automobile.

(T. at 376, 377).

Plaintiff testified

that Defendant reimbursed himself for any personal expenses out of
her proceeds from the sale of her home in California.

(T.

at

670) . If the court believed that a reimbursement had taken place,
then the claim for marital property is lost and the vehicle was
rightfully returned to Plaintiff.
The court determined that the asset was pre-marital.
finding was not clearly erroneous.

Its

It returned the property to

Plaintiff which did not amount to a clear abuse of discretion.
Burt

v.

Burt,

799 P.2d 1166, 1172 (Utah App. 1990).

The court

could have reasonably concluded that reimbursement was taken by
Defendant from Plaintiff's pre-marital funds.
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V.

DEFENDANT'S 4OIK RETIREMENT FUND WAS PROPERLY
VALUED ON THE DATE OP TRIAL, AND UTAH LAW SHOULD
GOVERN THE ISSUES OP PROPERTY DIVISION AND NOT THE
LAW OP CALIFORNIA.

The trial court has broad discretion

in making

equitable

orders with respect to property division in the Decree of Divorce.
Utah Code Ann. §30-3-5.

And, as a general rule,

the marital estate is valued at the time of the divorce
decree. Berger v. Berger,
713 P.2d 695, 697 (Utah 1985);
accord Fletcher
v. Fletcher,
615 P. 2d 1218, 1222,23 (Utah
1980).
Moreover, any deviation from the general rule must be
supported by sufficient detailed findings of fact that
explain the trial court's basis for such deviation.
Morgan
v.
Morgan,
795 P.2d 684, 688 (Utah App.
1990){Morgan
I).
Rappleye
see

v.

also

Rappleye,

215 Utah Adv. Rep. 45, 46 (June 15, 1993);

Jesperson

v.

Jesperson,

610

P.2d

326,

328

(Utah

1980)(citations omitted)("the marital estate is evaluated according
to what property exists at the time the marriage is terminated.11).
The

trial

court

made

no

findings

as

to

any

exceptional

circumstances which should take this case out of the presumptive
rule stated in Burt

v.

Burt,

799 P.2d 1166, 1172 (Utah App. 1990)

that the marital assets should be divided

equally between the

parties or from the general principles illustrated by the other
cases cited in this section.
The court in the instant case valued this asset on the date of
the decree.

There is no evidence of abuse of discretion and no

error in application of the law.
Defendant argues that California law applies to the division
of this asset.

There is no basis for this argument.

Defendant

consistently asserted Utah residency during these proceedings.
22

(T.

at 738)•

There is no case law to support Defendant's contention

that the state law of the state in which the income is produced
should in any way be considered in making a property distribution
during divorce particularly when both parties submit to the law of
the forum state and actively participate in proceedings there.
VI.

THE BLAZER AUTOMOBILE WAS PROPERLY VALUED ON THE
DATE OF THE TRIAL DESPITE A CONTENTION THAT IT HAD
BEEN REDUCED IN VALUE BY A THIRD PARTY DURING THE
SEPARATION OP THE PARTIES.

As a general rule,
the marital estate is valued at the time of the divorce
decree. Berger v. Berger,
713 P.2d 695, 697 (Utah 1985);
accord Fletcher
v. Fletcher,
615 P. 2d 1218, 1222,23 (Utah
1980).
Moreover, any deviation from the general rule must be
supported by sufficient detailed findings of fact that
explain the trial court's basis for such deviation.
Morgan
v.
Morgan,
795 P. 2d 684, 688 (Utah App.
1990){Morgan
I).
Rappleye
see

also

v. Rappleye,

215 Utah Adv. Rep. 45, 4 6 (June 15, 199 3 ) ;

Jesperson

v.

Jesperson,

610

P.2d

326,

328

(Utah

1980) (citations omitted) ("the marital estate is evaluated according
to what property exists at the time the marriage is terminated.11) .
The claim that the trial court clearly abused its discretion
cannot be sustained under the evidence before the court. The court
followed the controlling law in this State and valued the assets on
the

date

of

the

termination

of

the

marriage.

Further,

any

contention as to a decrease in value was heard by the court.

The

court is entitled to adjudicate the weight and credibility of the
witnesses and evidence before it. Yelderman
406,408 (Utah 1983).

v.

Yelderman,

669 P. 2d

Simply because the court declined to be
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persuaded by Defendant's testimony, ruling in favor of Plaintiff
does not in and of itself constitute reversible error.
VII. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION WHEN
IT DID NOT REQUIRE PLAINTIFF TO REPAY MONEY TAKEN
AS SALARY FROM THE BUSINESS WHEN THE SOLE EFFORTS
OF THE PLAINTIFF PRODUCED THE INCOME.
From the first court involvement in this matter, Plaintiff was
awarded the responsibility of the business.
full-time

to

sustain

the

participation by Defendant.

business

As such, she worked

without

any

effort

or

The court heard testimony from Mr.

Grimshaw, the accountant for the business, that for the first time
since it opened the business was turning a modest profit.
advised

Plaintiff

to withdraw the salary

equivalent

He

for her

personal efforts in the amount of $1,000.00 per month.
As a matter of equity, Plaintiff should have been compensated
for her efforts to single handedly run the business. The business
was enhanced by the efforts of Plaintiff, not diminished in any
way.

In fact, for the first time, the business was operating in

the black under the management of Plaintiff.

(T. at 748). The

court heard testimony and found that the business could not sustain
a separate manager.

(T. at 748).

The court had discretion to

determine that some compensation for significant effort was needed
in this case. The claim that the trial court abused its discretion
cannot be sustained under the facts and evidence of this case.
Plaintiff accounted for all funds of the business at the trial, and
sought competent advice from her bookkeeper before proceeding to
use surplus funds.
. . . .
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VIII.

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION WHEN
IT DID NOT ORDER PLAINTIFF TO PAY DEFENDANT FOR
DAMAGE TO FIREARMS WHEN SUCH DAMAGE WAS NOT THE
RESPONSIBILITY OF PLAINTIFF.

The only evidence before the court to sustain the incident of
damage to Defendant's guns was the testimony of Defendant himself.
Plaintiff's minor son Chris testified that he used the guns (T. at
2 68) but, there was no independent evidence that damage resulted
from the use.

It was apparent from the testimony of the minor

child that there were bad feelings between Defendant and himself.
(T. at 2 63 - 2 68).

The court was faced with the testimony before

it and weighed the credibility.

The court did not modify the

distribution to reflect Defendant's claim, but such action by the
court does not sustain the claim that there was a clear abuse of
discretion.
IX.

ARREARAGES FROM UNPAID CHILD SUPPORT DUE PLAINTIFF FROM
A PRIOR SPOUSE ARE NOT AN ASSET OF THE MARITAL ESTATE AND
WERE RIGHTFULLY ELIMINATED FROM THE MARITAL ESTATE OR
SHOULD BE ASSIGNED TO DEFENDANT FOR COLLECTION WITH AN
OFFSET TO PLAINTIFF.

Child support payments assessed against and unpaid by one
spouse can become a debt to the person who provided support, or the
child has the right personally to collect from the non-custodial
parent.

Hunter

v.

Hunter,

669 P.2d. 430 (Utah 1983).

Defendant married Plaintiff and took care of her and the minor
child from that point forward.

(T. at 379) .

Plaintiff's prior

spouse contributed nearly nothing during that time.

Plaintiff's

minor child has now passed his 18th birthday, but had not done so
prior to trial.

Whether or not Defendant actually contributed

$800.00 per month as child support for Plaintiff's minor son was
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not raised at trial, although it is undisputed that

Defendant

assumed the obligation to provide for the minor child during the
marriage.
It

seems

inappropriate

to

consider

obligations as an asset of a marriage.

unpaid

child

Marriage

support

is unlike a

business arrangement where ongoing debt is considered an asset.
Plaintiff's former spouse declared bankruptcy.
was before the court.
possibility

of

No other evidence

The court could have concluded that the

collecting

the

arrearages

was

therefore did not consider it an asset at all.

too

remote

and

The claim that the

trial court made an error of law simply cannot be sustained under
the evidence before it.
In the alternative, if this Court determines that indeed the
asset should have been considered, then perhaps the court should
apportion the asset to the Defendant, who by case authority has the
right to collect against the former spouse, and equalize that
amount with other assets from the marital

estate

in favor of

Plaintiff.

X.

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED DEFENDANT'S REQUEST TO
ASSESS CREDIT CARD DEBT AGAINST THE ASSETS OF THE
BUSINESS.

Defendant argues that the court did not accept his testimony
as to pre-separation marital debt and should not have required
Defendant to pay the debt.

Even though

there was no

testimony to the contrary, "evaluation of the weight and
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direct

credibility of testimony and evidence is a matter for the trier of
fact."

Yelderman

v.

Yeldermeui,

669 P.2d 406, 408 (Utah 1983).

Defendant misses the mark when he attempts to assign error to
the trial court when the court made no findings to justify the
result he seeks, and absent some special and specific finding one
is left to speculate as to the reasoning of the judge.

No case can

be found where such speculation justifies reversible error.

There

is no testimony or evidence in the record to suggest that the court
clearly abused it's discretion.
XI.

It simply exercised it.

DEPENDANT WAS PROPERLY HELD IN CONTEMPT
FOR HIS WILLFUL DISREGARD OF COURT ORDERS
AND IN LIGHT OF HIS PERSONAL MISCONDUCT
THROUGHOUT THE PROCEEDINGS IN THE COURT
BELOW.

Defendant was found in contempt of court after his willful
failure to obey an order of the court when he knew what was
required, had the ability to comply and intentionally failed to do
so.

Accordingly, Utah Code Annotated §78-32-1 et seq.,

case of VonHake

v, Thomas,

and the

759 P.2d 1162 (Utah 1988) supports the

court in finding Defendant in contempt.
On May 21, 1993, Defendant was ordered to use the IRS tax
refund to pay expenses of the business.

(R. at 24) .

raise the issue of the credit card debt at that time.
willfully failed to obey the order.

He did not
Instead, he

He chose to withhold the

refund from the control of the Plaintiff, who was in possession of
the business, and paid certain debts which he alone selected.

(T.

at 594) . He had exclusive control over the funds. When the matter
came to trial on or about December 10, 1992, Defendant still had
27

not complied with the court's order, nor had he complied at the
time of the post-trial motion hearing before the court.
court's

finding of contempt was not clearly

erroneous.

The
It's

finding should be affirmed.
CONCLUSION
The judgment of the trial court should be affirmed as to all
aspects of the property settlement.

The judgment of the trial

court should be reversed as to the issues of attorney fees and
alimony as more fully stated in the Brief of Cross-Appellant herein
below.

BRIEF OF CROSS-APPELLANT

JURISDICTIONAL AUTHORITY
Jurisdiction is vested with the Court of Appeals pursuant to
Utah Code Annotated § 78-2a-3(2)(i) (1992).
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
The issues presented for review are as follows:
1.

Did the Trial Court abuse its discretion when it failed to

award Plaintiff alimony.

The applicable standard of appellate

review

this

for

resolution

of

issue

discretion" standard as cited in Kerr

v.

is
Kerr,

the

"clear

abuse

of

610 P.2d 1380, 1382

(Utah 1980).
2.

Did the Trial Court abuse its discretion when it denied

Plaintiff's

request

that

Defendant

pay

attorney's

fees?

The

applicable standard of appellate review for resolution of this
28

issue is the "clear abuse of discretion" standard as cited in
v.

Kerr,

Kerr

610 P.2d 1380, 1382 (Utah 1980).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES,
RULES, AND REGULATIONS

Utah Code Annotated §3 0-3-3
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
As presented infra,

at page

5

and incorporated herein by this

reference to avoid unnecessary repetition here.
STATEMENT OP PACTS
As presented infra,

at page

7 and incorporated herein by this

reference to avoid unnecessary repetition here.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Plaintiff, Appellee and Cross-Appellant argues that the trial
court made two errors.

First, when it failed to award alimony;

Second, when it failed to award attorney fees.
As to Plaintiff/Cross-Appellant's claim that the court erred
when it failed to award alimony, the Court's attention is called to
the great disparity of income. Plaintiff would be able to earn the
maximum of $13,800 per year (assuming she could earn the highest
salary found reasonable by the trial court) and Defendant would
continue to earn in excess of $70,000 per year.
The Court's attention is further focused on the trial court's
failure to make proper findings as to the elements stated in

Watson

v.

court

Watson,

837 P.2d

1, 3

(Utah App. 1992).

The trial

overlooked the effect that selling the parties marital property
(the

business

called

the

Sportsman's
29

Lounge)

would

have

on

Plaintiff's earnings.
that business.

Presently she draws $1,000 per month from

However, when it is sold, Plaintiff will be unable

to earn a replacement income. The trial court found that she could
earn at the minimum wage rate, and that amount will simply not
permit Plaintiff to maintain her needs.
lifestyles of the parties, and

It will not equalize the

it will not provide

sufficient

income to prevent her from becoming a public charge.
The trial court failed to make proper findings with regard to
Defendant's ability to pay.

There are inadequate findings as to

the needs and lifestyle of the Defendant, and most importantly, the
reasonableness of the expenses stated to the court.
As to the Plaintiff/Cross-Appellant's claim that the court
erred

in not awarding attorney fees to Plaintiff, the Court's

attention is called to the case of Haumont
421,426 (Utah App. 1990).

v.

Haumont,

793 P. 2d

There the Court required the trial court

to make a sufficient record identifying factors it considered in
not awarding the entire attorney as requested by a party at trial.
The trial court here made no such record.
of Bell
Muir,
trial

v.

Bell,

In addition, the cases

810 P.2d 489, 493 (Utah App. 1991) and Muir

v.

841 P.2d 736, 741-742 (Utah App 1992) acknowledge that the
court

has

some

discretion

in

awarding

attorney

fees.

However, the cases also require that the court make particular
findings with
spouse,

the

regard
ability

to the
of

the

financial
other

reasonableness of the requested fees.

need
spouse

of the
to

pay

and

the

Here the court failed to

make any finding as to the reasonableness of the fee.
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requesting

Plaintiff
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ARGUMENT

I.

THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS Oil"" ' "

'""! "I

""" I U«"I » "'0

AWARD PLAINTIFF ALIMONY.
7*
-MQ

tridi c ir t idiiti-:

material

issues for- determining an appropriate alimony award.

- .

re w e n established

arnes
uu
V

-iKe adequate factual findings on

••

-arnes,
Ho

,s

tan ?* <.

r C p 26,

0Q

fntah App.

^ i ^ n ^ h^'/p bppr. jonciseli stated in

:. ..

Watson

92)

' ' awarding alimony, appellate courts require the trial
court to consider each of the following three factors:
(1) the financial conditions and needs of tne receiving
spouse; (2) the ability of the receiving spouse to
produce a sufficient income for himself or herself; and
(3) the ability of the responding spouse to provide
support. If these three factors have been considered, we
will not disturb the trial court's alimony award unless
such a serious inequity has resulted to manifest a clear
abuse of discreti-;. -. The ultimate test of an alimc"'
award is whether the party receiving alimony will be able
to support him or herself 'as nearly as possible at the
standard of living
enjoyed d.,rinq the marriage."
Id at 3 (ci tationV
. r.ed)'.
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"In considering these factors, the trial court is required to
make adequate factual findings on all material issues, unless the
facts in the record are 'clear, uncontroverted, and capable of
supporting only a finding in favor of the judgment.'" Barnes
Barnes,

v.

217 Utah Adv. Rep 26, 29 (Utah July 13, 1993) (citations

omitted).
The trial court's findings relevant to alimony (T. at 759-762)
consisted

of

Schindler,

the

116

determining

an

court's

P.2d

attempt

84,

alimony

91

to

(Utah

award.

follow
App.

First,

the

1989)

the

Schindler

v.

criteria

court

for

found

Plaintiff needed $605 per month plus housing costs.

that

It further

found that the average mortgage expense was $450 per month for a
total need of $1,055 per month. (T. at 759). The court failed to
consider

the

importantly,

standard
it failed

of

living

of

the

parties

to consider the effect

and

most

of selling

the

business from which Plaintiff derived the largest share of her
income.

The court determined that upon sale of the marital estate

properties,

substantial

cash would

be generated

and

that

the

Plaintiff would have no dependents to support.
Next, the court addressed the ability of the receiving spouse
to produce a sufficient

income for herself.

The court

found

Plaintiff capable of producing $5 to $6 per hour outside the bar in
sales or clerical employment.

Even at the $6 per hour rate,

Plaintiff will only be able to earn $1,040 per month working fulltime.

This would not sustain her basic needs, let alone provide
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for the same standard of living as Defendant or as she enjoyed
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resources to provide additional support for Plaintiff, the Trial
Court's failure to award alimony is inequitable.
As

articulated

by

the

Utah

Supreme

Court,

"[t]he

most

important function of alimony is to provide support for the wife as
nearly as possible at the standard of living she enjoyed during the
marriage, and to prevent the wife from becoming a public charge.11
English

v.

award

English,

should,

to

565 P.2d 409, 411 (Utah 1977).
the

extent

possible,

respective post-divorce living standards.
P.2d 1076, 1081 (Utah 1988); Jones
(Utah 1985); Rasband
1988).

The Utah

v. Rasband,

v.

be

Gardner

Jones,

v.

by

parties'

Gardner,

748

700 P.2d 1072, 1075

Supreme Court has articulated

considered

the

752 P.2d 1331, 1333 (Utah Ct. App.

(hereinafter referred to as the "Jones
that must

equalize

An alimony

three

test" or "Jones

the Trial

Court

factors

factors1')

in determining

a

reasonable alimony award:
1.
2.

The financial conditions and needs of the requesting
spouse;
The ability of the requesting spouse to
produce a sufficient income for himself or
herself; and

3.

The ability of the other spouse to provide support.

Gardner,

748 P.2d at 1081; Jones,

700 P.2d at 1075; Rasband,

752

P.2d at 1333.
The Trial Court's decision regarding

alimony will not be

overturned "absent an abuse of discretion or manifest injustice."
Watson

v.

Watson,

837 P.2d 1, 3 (Utah Ct. App. 1992).

Court's failure to consider the Jones
of a Trial Court's discretion.
(Utah 1986) . If the Jones

Paffel

A Trial

factors constitutes an abuse
v.

Paffel,

732 P.2d 96, 101

factors have been considered, an appeals
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The Court failed to adequately and accurately substantiate many of
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arM
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Defendant's

need-.
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w.is

I llllii •

not

"III"!' 1 . i II

C c 1 1:1: t • s

supported

by

adequate

findings.

approximately
divorce.

The

parties

12 years and had

Id. at 491.

in

Bell

one child

had

been

married

at the time of

the

The husband was ordered to pay $450.00 per

month in child support and $250.00 in alimony for two years.

The

husband was also ordered to pay a portion of the wife's attorney
fees.

Id.
In Bell

at the time of the trial, the wife was pursuing a

masters degree in education and was making $863.00 per month.

Id.

Prior to that time she had a different job where she made $1,500.00
per month or approximately $18,000.00 per year.

The husband was a

major in the Air Force and at the time of the divorce was making
$3,660.00 per month or approximately $40,000.00 per year.
wife claimed monthly
claimed $5,090.74.

Id.

The

expenses of $2,493.00, while the husband
Id. at 493.

The wife appealed the court's decision and asserted, among
other things, that the award for alimony was insufficient.

In

reversing the trial court's alimony award, the Court of Appeals
determined that the award was not supported by adequate findings.
Id. at 493.
pronged Jones

The trial court had essentially ignored the threetest by making inadequate findings regarding the

needs of the husband and wife and the wife's ability to support
herself.

Id.

In addition, the court made no findings regarding

the reasonableness of claimed expenses by the husband and wife and
only found that each party had roughly equivalent debts in their
names.

Id.

Specifically, the Court there as here failed to find
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I
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i
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-
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id^

T
made findings is i

the parties' gross nn'.'ir.es

" l. s rot :nr.e t-he

required findings as to the wife's needs.

Id. at 1213.

The Court

of Appeals, looking at the fact that the husband's gross income was
$8,200.00 and the wife's only $2,445.00, concluded that the alimony
set by court "[did] not come close to equalizing the parties'
standard of living as of the time of divorce, but allows plaintiff
a two to four times advantage."

Id.

The court found clear error

and remanded the case for findings as to the parties' needs, the
parties' standard of living at the time of the trial, and for
adjustments

to

the

alimony

"to

better

equalize

the

abilities to go forward with their respective lives."
Like Bell,

Gardner,

Howell,

parties'

Id.

the Court in the present action

should also reverse the Trial Court's alimony award because its
findings

are

result.

The

inadequate
award

and

fails

to

because

injustice would

reasonably

equalize

otherwise

the

parties

standard's of living and denies Plaintiff the ability to adequately
move forward.
A great disparity
Defendant.

of income exists between Plaintiff

and

At the outset, Plaintiff's income is $13,800 per year

and Defendant's is in excess of $70,000.

A substantial disparity

of income still exists between Plaintiff and Defendant following
the Court's failure to award alimony.
It is obvious that the income figures are inequitable and far
from equalized. As explained

in Bell,

"[w]ithout a finding on

reasonable expenses, we are unable to determine the true needs of
wife,

or

to

determine

husband's

actual

ability

to

pay

and,

therefore, to balance wife's needs against husband's ability to pay
38
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men working full time.
Commerce, Money Income
in

the

United

Bureau of the Census, U.S. Department of
and Poverty

States,

Status

of Families

and

Persons

1986, Current Population Reports, Series P-

60, No. 157, at 2 (1987).
Men

experienced

a 42% improvement

in their

post

divorce

standard of living, while women experienced a 73% decline.

Id. at

338-339.
Studies have also found that a wife's employability actually
decreases with time out of the work force.
Career

Opportunity

Determination,

Cost:

A

See Beninger & Smith's,

Factor

in

16 Fam. L.Q. 201, 203 (1982).

Spousal

Support

When a wife invests

her resources jointly in the husband's "human capital" rather than
the wife's, the couple creates a growing disparity in their earning
potential.
Economic
Awards,
In

See Weitzman, The Economics

Consequences

of

Property,

of

Divorce:

Alimony

and

Social
Child

and
Support

28 UCLA L. Rev. 1181, 1210-11 (1981).
this

substantial

case,
time

Plaintiff

and

energy

is

40

during

years
the

old.

seven

She

year

spent

marriage

enhancing her husband's value in the paid labor market, but lost
the opportunity to establish or increase her own earning potential.
While Defendant was able to advance in his field, Plaintiff, at
Defendant's

request, sacrificed

her employment

skills

and her

professional abilities to stay home and care for their home, her
minor child and the family business.
Presently, her chances to advance in her modelling career are
minimal.

She must continue to work to support herself and based on
40

the present economic conditions, cannot quit her job and go back to
school to better herself.
poverty level.

She will likely live near or below the

Plaintiff is entitled to and in need of an alimony

award, even if it means Defendant is "not left with much money to
See Schindler

live on."
App.

1989)

together

(even

with

v.

though

debts

Schindler,
alimony

that

left

776 P.2d 84, 91 (Utah Ct.
and

him

child

without

support
means

payments,
to

satisfy

financial obligations, left plaintiff without much money to live
on, award was not inherently improper).
II.

THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT FAILED TO
AWARD PLAINTIFF ATTORNEY FEES.

The Trial Court concluded that there would be sufficient funds
generated from the property settlement for each party to pay their
respective attorney fees.

(T. at 762) .

In so concluding, the

Court abused its discretion.
Utah Code Annotated §30-3-3 "affords litigants a broader award
of reimbursement, if need be, for the expenses of litigation, than
those reimbursements authorized in other civil cases." Peterson
Peterson,

v.

818 P. 2d 1305, 1310 (Utah App. 1991) (citation omitted)

quoted in Rappleye

v.

Rappleye,

215 Utah Adv. Rep. 45, 48 (Utah,

June 15, 1993).
The

court

failed

to

make

adequate

findings

regarding

Plaintiff's need for reimbursement, the parties ability to pay the
same, and the reasonableness of the fees in light of testimony and
the requirements of Rasband

v.

App. 1988)(citation omitted).

Rasband,

752 P. 2d 1331, 13 3 6 (Utah

This failure constitutes abuse of

discretion and reversible error.
41

In Haumont v.

Haumont,

793 P. 2d 421, 426 (Utah App. 1990) the

court stated:
"[The] court abuses its discretion in awarding less than
the amount [of attorney fees] requested unless
the
reduction is warranted" by one or more of the above
factors.
The trial court must, accordingly, identify
such factors on the record and also explain its sua
sponte reduction in order to permit meaningful review on
appeal, (citations omitted).
The trial court failed to comply with these requirements,
thereby abusing its discretion.

In the absence of the appropriate

findings by the trial court, meaningful review is not possible on
this issue.
Plaintiff also requests attorney fees on appeal.

In the event

Plaintiff prevails on this issue, the court should include as part
of its remand order, the directive to the trial court to consider
such fees in light of the disposition of this appeal.

Such a

request appears consistent with the s^me issue stated in

Rappleye

v.

R&ppleye,
At

215 Utah Adv. Rep. 45, 49 (Utah June 15, 1993).

trial

Plaintiff's

attorney

offered

Plaintiff's attorney fees were reasonable.

evidence

that

(T. at 439 et.

seq.).

In addition, Plaintiff testified that she did not have the funds
available to pay the fees.
rebutted.

(T. at 244) .

The testimony was un-

The Court, in its Findings of Fact, does not comment on

the reasonableness,

or lack thereof,

of the

fees.

Pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 30-3-3 (1989), a trial court
has the power to award attorney fees in divorce proceedings.

An

award must be based on (1) evidence of the financial need of the
receiving spouse, (2) the ability of the other spouse to pay, and
42

Bell

(3) the reasonableness of the requested fees.
P.2d 489, 493 (Utah Ct. App. 1991);
741-742

(Utah

App.

1992).

The

Muir v.

decision

v. Bell,

Muir,
to

810

841 P.2d 736,

award

fees

lies

primarily within the sound discretion of the trial court. Id.
In Muir,

the wife's attorney proffered testimony regarding the

amount and reasonableness of the attorney fee.
attorney did not object.

The husband's

The Court then found that the wife

incurred legal fees amounting to approximately

$15,000.00.

It

ordered the husband to pay only $3,000.00 of those fees, offering
no explanation for the reduction.
the Trial Court

failed

The Court of Appeals noted that

to find whether wife needed

financial

assistance and it made no findings regarding the husband's ability
to pay the wife's attorney
proffered

fees.

Moreover, despite

evidence

by the wife's attorney, the Court failed to make a

finding regarding the reasonableness of the fees.
That is exactly what the Trial Court did in the instant case.
On remand in Muir concerning the issue of attorney fees, the Trial
Court was directed to make specific findings regarding Plaintiff's
financial

need

and

Defendant's

ability

to

pay,

and

further

directing the Trial Court that if it finds both need and ability to
pay,

it

must

reasonableness

then

Adams,

independent

findings

regarding

of all fees and costs, including attorney

incurred on appeal.
v.

make

The Muir court cited with approval

fees

Martindale

111 P.2d 514, 517-18 (Utah App. 1989):

Where "the evidence supporting the reasonableness of
requested fees is both adequate and entirely undisputed,
. . . the court abuses its discretion in awarding less
than the amount requested unless
the reduction is
43

the

warranted" by one or more of the established factors.
The trial court must, accordingly, identify such factors
on the record and also explain its sua sponte reduction
in order to permit meaningful review on appeal.
See also Rappleye

v. Rappleye,

215 Utah Adv. Rep. 45 (Utah Ct. App.

filed June 15, 1993).
In Andersen

v.

Andersen,

757 P. 2d 476, 480 (Utah App. 1988)

the Utah Court of Appeals held that the trial court's failure to
award attorney fees was an abuse of discretion.

The court focused

on

the

the

great

Plaintiff's

disparity

net

in

monthly

earnings

income

Defendant's was $1,405.00. Id.

was

between

parties.

Id.

$200.00

and

approximately

Furthermore, Plaintiff testified

she had no means to pay the fees and the parties stipulated that
Plaintiff's attorney fees were reasonable.

Id.

The court noted

that "Plaintiff's income and earning ability paled in comparison to
those of Defendant.

Id.

Like the Andersen

court, the Trial Court here abused

discretion when it failed to award attorney fees.

its

Plaintiff's

income and earning ability pale in comparison to those of the
Defendant.
Whitehead

The facts in this case are not like the facts in
v.

and Hoagland

Whitehead,
v.

836 P.2d 814, 817-18 (Utah Ct. App. 1992)

Hoagland,

212 Utah Adv. Rep. 25, 27 (Utah Ct. App.

1993) where the Court affirmed a non-award of attorney fees after
concluding
essentially

the

financial

equal.

circumstances

of

the

In this case, Plaintiff's

incomes are substantially unequal.
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parties

and

were

Defendant's

Further, as evidenced under the first argument, the Court
failed to correctly and adequately ascertain Plaintiff's financial
need and Defendant's ability to pay.

The Court, consequently,

could not accurately determine that Defendant did not have the
means to pay the fees.

Defendant is in a much greater position to

absorb the costs of the divorce than Plaintiff who has a relatively
low paying job.
III.
Considering
Plaintiff
reality

the

great

CONCLUSION
disparity

and the Defendant, the
that

the

Plaintiff

opportunities

for

her

incomes

between

the

length of the marriage, the

has

marriage

in

sacrificed
and

now

has

her

employment

only

limited

occupational opportunities and skills, Plaintiff is entitled to and
in great need of an increased amount of alimony and the payment of
attorney

fees.

The

Trial

Court's

findings,

and

thus

its

conclusions, regarding alimony and attorney fees were based on
faulty

and

Plaintiff.

incomplete

reasoning

that

favored

Defendant

over

The Court did not accurately ascertain Plaintiff's

needs and Defendant's ability to pay.

As a consequence, the Trial

Court inequitably and unjustly made no alimony award and also
failed completely to award attorney fees.

The Trial Court clearly

abused its discretion, mandating a reversal of its judgment on
those two issues.
THEREFORE, This Court should REVERSE AND REMAND this case to
the trial court with direction that the trial court award Plaintiff
permanent alimony of an equitable amount per month and order the
45

Defendant to pay Plaintiff's attorney fees.
incurred

by

Plaintiff

on

appeal

should

Attorney's

likewise

be

fees

awarded,

together with all costs related thereto,
DATED this

//
^
/&?day of September, 1993.
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any provision for separate maintenance previously
granted.
(5) (a) A divorce may not be granted on the
grounds of insanity unless: (i) the defendant has
been adjudged insane by the appropriate authorities of this or another state prior to the commencement of the action; and (ii) the court find£
by the testimony of competent witnesses that the
insanity of the defendant is incurable.
(b) The court shall appoint for the defendant a
guardian ad litem, who shall protect the interests
of the defendant. A copy of the summons and
complaint shall be served on the defendant in
person or by publication, as provided by the law?
of this state in other actions for divorce, or upon
his guardian ad litem, and upon the county attorney for the county where the action is prosecuted(c) The county attorney shall investigate the
merits of the case and if the defendant resides out
of this state, take depositions as necessary, attend the proceedings, and make a delense as I?
just to protect the rights of the defendant and the
interests of the state.
<d) In all actions the court and judge have jurisdiction over the payment of alimony, the distribution of property, and the custody and maintenance of minor children, as the courts and
judges possess in other actions for divorce.
(e) The plaintiff or defendant may, if the defendant resides in this state, upon notice, have
the defendant brought into the court at trial, of
have an examination of the defendant by two or
more competent physicians, to determine the
mental condition of the defendant. For this purpose either party may have leave from the court
to enter any asylum or institution where the defendant may be confined. The costs of court in
this action shall he apportioned by the court. 198"
30-3-2. Right of husband to divorce.
The husband may in all cases obtain a divorce from
his wife for the same causes and in the same manner
as the wife may obtain a divorce from her husband.
1953

30-3-3.

Award of costs, attorney and witness
fees — Temporary alimony.
(1) In any action filed under Title 30. Chapter 3, 4.
or 6, and in any action to establish an order of custody, visitation, child support, alimony, or division o(
property in a domestic case, the court may order a
party to pay the costs, attorney fees, and witness fees,
including expert witness fees, of the other party to
enable the other party to prosecute or defend the action. The order may include provision for costs of the
action.
(2) In any action to enforce an order of custody,
visitation, child support, alimony, or division of property in a domestic case, the court may award costs
and attorney fees upon determining that the party
substantially prevailed upon the claim or defense.
The court, in its discretion, may award no fees or
limited fees against a party if the court finds the
party is impecunious or enters in the record the reason for not awarding fees.
(3) In any action listed in Subsection (1), the court
may order a party to provide money, during the pendency of the action, for the separate support and
maintenance of the other party and of any children in
the custody of the other party.
(4) Orders entered under this section prior to entry
of the final order or judgment may be amended dur-

1194

ing the course of the action or in the final order or
judgment
1993
30-3-4.

P l e a d i n g s — F i n d i n g s — Decree — Sealing.
(1) (a; The complaint shall be in writing and
signed by the plaintiff or plaintiffs attorney.
(b) A decree of divorce may not be granted
upon default or otherwise except upon legal evidence taken in the cause
(c) If the plaintiff and the defendant have a
child or children and the plaintiff has filed an
action in the judicial district as defined in Section 78-1-2.1 where the pilot program shall be
administered, a decree of divoice may not be
granted until both parties have attended a mandatory course provided in Section 30-3-11.3 and
have presented a certificate of course completion
to the court The court may waive this requirement, on its own motion or on the motion of one
of the parties, if it determine 4 " COUIM* attendance
and completion are not necessar\, appropriate,
feasible, or in the best interest of the parties.
<d> All hearings and trials foi divorce shall be
held before the court u; ;!,«• uiuil < <»mmissioner
as provided by Section 7<s >-31 and rules of the
Judicial Council. The couit or the commissioner
in all divorce cases shall make and file findings
and decree upon the evidence.
(2) The file, except the decree of divorce, may be
sealed by order of the court upon the motion of either
public only upon an order of the court 'I he concerned
parties, the attorneys of record or attorney filing a
notice of appearance in the action, the Office of Recovery Services if a party to the proceedings has applied for or is receiving public as.Mstanee. or the court
h a \ e full access to the entire record This sealing does
not apply to subsequent filings to enforce or amend
the decree.
1992
30-3-4.1 t o 30-3-4.4.

Repealed.

1990

30-3-5.\ Disposition of property — Maintenance
and health care of parties and children
— Division of debts — Court to h a v e
continuing jurisdiction — Custody and
visitation — Termination of alimony —
Nonmeritorious petition for modification — Meritorious petition for modification (Effective until January 1, 1994J.
(1) When a decree of divorce is rendered, the court
may include in it equitable orders relating to the children, property, debts or obligations, and parties The
court shall include the following in every decree of
divorce:
(a) an order assigning responsibility for the
payment of reasonable and necessary medical
and dental expenses of the dependent children;
<bi if coverage is available at a reasonable
cost, an order requiring the purchase and maintenance of appropriate health, hospital, and dental care insurance for the dependent children;
and
(c) pursuant to Section 15-4-6.5
<i) an order specifying which party is responsible for the payment of joint debts, obligations, or liabilities of the parties contracted or incurred during marriage;
(ii) an order requiring the parties to notify
respective creditors or obligees, regarding
the court's division of debts, obligations, or

30-3-2
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any provision for separate maintenance previouslv
granted
(5) (a) A divorce may not be granted on the
grounds of insanity unless (i t l t defendant h i s
been adjudged insane b> the «pf r jpnate authon
tit4- of this or another state pnor to the com
menccment of the action, and u n the couit finds
b\ the testimony of competent witnesses that the
insanity of the defendant is mcurabU
<bi The court shall appoint for the defendant i
guardian ad litem, who shall protect the interests
of the defendant A copy of the summons and
complaint shall be served on the defendant in
person or b\ publication, as provided bv the laws
of this state in other actions for di\orce or upon
his- guardian ad litem and upon the countv ?ttor
ne\ for the county where the action is prosecuted
<c> The county attorney shall investigate the
merit** of the case and if the defendant reside* out
if tl is st iu take deposition- is run
nv it
tend the proceedings and make a detense as is
just to protect the rights of the defendant and the
interests of the state
<d> In all actions the court and judge ha\e ju
nsdiction over the pavment of ahmonv the dis
tnbution of property, and the cu^todv and main
tenance of minor children, as the courts and
judges possess in other actions for divorce
(e) The plaintiff or defendant may if the defendant resides in this state upon notice, have
the defendant brought into the court at trial or
hav< in examination of the <M« rid int 1 \ two or
more competent phvsiuans to determine the
mental condition of the defend int For this pur
pose either partv ma\ have leave from the court
to enter an\ asvlum or institution where the defendant mav be confined The costs of court in
this action shall be apportion* d b\ the court 1987
30-3-2 Right of husband to d i v o r c e .
The husband may in all cases obtain a divorce from
his wife for the same causes and in the same manner
as the w ife mav obtain a divorce from her husband
1953

30-3-3.

A w a r d of costs, a t t o r n e y and w i t n e s s
fees — Temporary alimony.
(1) In anv action filed under Title 30 Chapter 3, 4,
or 6, and in anv action to estabhsh an order of custodv v isitation. child support, ahmonv or division of
propertv in a domestic case, the court mav order a
partv to pav the costs, attorney fees and witness fees,
including expert witness fees of the other partv to
enable the other part> to prosecute or defend the action 1 he order mav include prov ision for costs of the
action
(2) In anv action to enforce an order of custody,
visitation child support alimony or division of prop
ertv in a domestic case, the court mav award costs
and attornev fees upon determining that the party
substantially prevailed upon the claim or defense
The court, in its discretion, ma) award no fees or
limited fees against a party if the court finds the
partv is impecunious or enters in the record the rea
son tor not awarding fees
(3) In anv action listed in Subsection (1) the court
ma) order a party to provide monev during the pendencv of the action, for the separate support and
maintenance of the other party and of any children in
the custodv of the other part>
<4) Orders entered under this section prior to entry
of the final order or judgment mav be amended dur-

1194

ing the course of tne action or in the final order or
judgment
1993
30-3-4

P l e a d i n g s — Findings — Decree — Sealing.
(1) (a) The complaint shall be in writing and
signed bv the plaintiff or plaintiffs attorney
(b) A decree of divorce mav not be granted
upon default or otherwise except upon lega1 e\i
dence taken in the cause
(c) If the plaintifl and the defendant have a
child or children and the plaintiff has filed an
action in the judicial district as defined in Sec
tion 78 1-2 1 where the pilot program shall be
administered, a decree of divorce ma> not be
granted until both parties have attended a mandatory course provided in Section 30 3 113 and
have presented a certificate of course completion
to the court The court mav waive this requirement on its own motion or on the motion of one
ol the parties it u determines course attendance
and completion are not necessary, appropriate,
feasible, or in the best interest of the parties
(d) All hearings and trials for divorce shall be
held before the court or the court commissioner
as provided by Section 78 3-31 and rules of the
Judicial Council The court or the commissioner
in all divorce cases shall make and file findings
and decree upon the evidence
(2) The file, except the decree of divorce, may be
sealed bv order of the court upon the motion of either
p irtv The sealed portion of the file is available to the
public oniv upon an order of the court rl he concerned
parties, the attorneys of record or attornev filing a
notice of appearance in the action, the Office of Recovery Services if a party to the proceedings has applied for or is receiving public assibtance, or the court
have full access to the entire record This sealing does
not appl> to subsequent filings to enforce or amend
the decree
1992
30-3-4.1 to 30-3-4.4.
30-3-5.

Repealed.

1990

Disposition of property — Maintenance
and health care of parties and children
— Division of debts — Court to have
continuing jurisdiction — Custody and
visitation — Termination of alimony —
Nonmeritonous petition for modification — Meritorious petition for modification (Effective until January 1, 1994J.
(1) When a decree of divorce is rendered, the court
mav include in it equitable orders relating to the children, property, debts or obligations and parties The
court shall include the following in every decree of
divorce
<a) an order assigning responsibility for the
pavment of reasonable and necessary medical
and dental expenses of the dependent children,
(b) if coverage is available at a reasonable
cost, an order requiring the purchase and maintenance of appropriate health, hospital, and dental care insurance for the dependent children,
and
(c) pursuant to Section 15-4-6 5
(0 an order specifying which party is responsible for the payment of joint debts, obligations, or liabilities of the parties contracted or incurred during marriage,
(n) an order requiring the parties to notify
respective creditors or obligees, regarding
the court's division of debts, obligations, or
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liabilities and regarding the parties' separate, current addresses, and
(in) provisions for the enforcement of
these orders.
(2) The court may include, in an order determining
child support, an order assigning financial responsibility for all or a portion of child care expenses incurred on behalf of the dependent children, necessitated by the employment or training of the custodial
parent. If the court determines that the circumstances are appropriate and that the dependent children would be adequately cared for, it may include an
order allowing the noncustodial parent to provide the
day care for the dependent children, necessitated by
the employment or training of the custodial parent.
(3) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make
subsequent changes or new orders for the support and
maintenance of the parties, the custody of the children and their support, maintenance, health, and
dental care, or the distribution of the property and
obligations for debts as is reasonable and necessary.
<4> In determining visitation rights oi parents,
grandparents, and other members of the immediate
family, the court shall consider the best interest of
the child.
(5) Unless a decree of divorce specifically provides
otherwise, any order of the court that a party pay
alimony to a former spouse automatically terminates
upon the remarriage of that former spouse. However,
if the remarriage is annulled and found to be void ab
initio, payment of alimony shall resume if the party
paying alimony is made a party to the action of annulment and his rights are determined.
t6> Any order of the court that a party pay alimony
to a former spouse terminates upon estabhshment by
the party paying alimony that the former spouse is
residing with a person of the opposite sex However, if
it is further established by the person receiving alimony that that relationship or association is without
any sexual contact, payment of alimony shall resume.
(7) If a petition for modification of child custody or
visitation provisions of a court order is made and denied, the court shall order the petitioner to pay the
reasonable attorney's fees expended by the prevailing
party in that action, if the court determines that the
petition was without merit and not asserted or defended against in good faith.
(8) If a petition alleges substantial noncompliance
with a visitation order by a parent, a grandparent, or
other member of the immediate family pursuant to
Section 78-32-12.2 where a visitation right has been
previously granted by the court, the court may award
to the prevailing party costs, including actual attorney fees and court costs incurred by the prevailing
party because of the other party's failure to provide or
exercise court-ordered visitation
i*w.i
Disposition of property — Mainten a n c e and health care of parties and
children — Division of debts — Court
to have continuing jurisdiction — Custody and visitation — Termination of
alimony — Nonmeritorious petition for
modification (Effective January 1,
1994J.
(1) When a decree of divorce is rendered, the court
may include in it equitable orders relating to the children, property, debts or obligations, and parties. The
court shall include the following in every decree of
divorce:

30-3-5

(a) an order assigning responsibility for the
payment of reasonable and necessary medical
and dental expenses of the dependent children,
(b) if coverage is or becomes available at a reasonable cost, an order requiring the purchase and
maintenance of appropriate health, hospital, and
dental care insurance for the dependent children;
(c) pursuant to Section 15-4-6.5:
d) an order specifying which party is responsible for the payment of joint debts, obligations, or liabilities of the parties contracted or incurred during marriage;
(ii) an order requiring the parties to notify
respective creditors or obligees, regarding
the court's division of debts, obligations, or
liabilities and regarding the parties' separate, current addresses; and
(in) provisions for the enforcement of
these orders,
(d) provisions for income withholding in accordance with Title 62A, Chapter 11, Parts 4 and 5;
and
(e) with regard to child support orders issued
or modified on or after January 1, 1994, that are
subject to income withholding, an order assessing
against the obligor an additional $7 per month
check processing fee to be included in the amount
withheld and paid to the Office of Recovery Services within the Department of Human Services
for the purposes of income withholding in accordance with Title 62A, Chapter 11, Parts 4 and 5
(2) The court may include, in an order determining
child support, an order assigning financial responsibility for all or a portion of child care expenses incurred on behalf of the dependent children, necessitated by the employment or training of the custodial
parent. If the court determines that the circum
stances are appropriate and that the dependent children would be adequately cared for. it may include an
order allowing the noncustodial parent to provide the
day care for the dependent children, necessitated by
the employment or training of the custodial parent.
(3) The court has continuing jurisdiction tc make
subsequent changes or new orders for the support and
maintenance of the parties, the custody of the children and their support, maintenance, health, and
dental care, or the distribution of the property and
obligations for debts as is reasonable and necessary.
(4) In determining visitation rights of parents,
grandparents, and other members of the immediate
family, the court shall consider the best interest of
the child.
(5) Unless a decree of divorce specifically provides
otherwise, any order of the court that a party pay
alimony to a former spouse automatically terminates
upon the remarriage of that former spouse. However,
if the remarriage is annulled and found to be void ab
initio, payment of alimony shall resume if the party
paying alimony is made a party to the action of annulment and his rights are determined.
(6) Any order of the court that a party pay alimony
to a former spouse terminates upon establishment by
the party paying alimony that the former spouse is
residing with a person of the opposite sex. However, if
it is further established by the person receiving alimony that that relationship or association is without
any sexual contact, payment of alimony shall resume.
(7) If a petition for modification of child custody or
visitation provisions of a court order is made and denied, the court shall order the petitioner to pay the
reasonable attorneys' fees expended by the prevailing
party in that action, if the court determines that the
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petition was without merit and not asserted or defended against in good faith
(8) If a petition alleges substantial noncompliance
with a visitation order by a parent, a grandparent, or
other member of the immediate family pursuant to
Section 78-32-12 2 where a visitation right has been
previously granted by the court, the court may award
to the prevailing party costs, including actual attor
ney fees and court costs incurred by the prevailing
party because of the other party's failure to provide or
exercise court-ordered visitation
I9*M
30-3-5.1.

P r o v i s i o n for income w i t h h o l d i n g in
child s u p p o r t o r d e r .
Whenever a court enters an order for child support
it shall include in the order a provision for withholding income as a means of collecting child support as
provided in Title 62A, Chapter 11, Part 4
199J

30-3-5.2.

Allegations of child a b u s e o r child sexual a b u s e — Investigation
When, in any divorce proceeding or upon a request
for modification of a divorce decree, an allegation of
child abuse or child sexual abuse is made, implicating
either party, the court shall order that an investigation be conducted by the Division of Family Services
within the Department of Human Services in accordance with Title 62A, Chapter 4, Part 5 A final
award of custody or visitation may not be rendered
until a report on that investigation is received by the
court. That investigation shall be conducted by the
Division of Family Services within 30 days of the
court's notice and request for an investigation In reviewing this report, the court shall comply with Section 78-7-9
1992
30-3-5.5, 30-3-6.

Repealed.

nwi. I<WJ

30-3-7. When d e c r e e b e c o m e s a b s o l u t e .
(1) The decree of divorce becomes absolute
(a) on the date it is signed by the court £nd
entered by the clerk in the register of actions if
both the parties who have a child or children and
the plaintifT has filed an action in the judicial
district as defined in Section 78-1-2.1 where the
pilot program is administered and have completed attendance at the mandatory course provided in Section 30-3-113 except if the court
waives the requirement, on its own motion or on
the motion of one of the parties, upon determination that course attendance and completion are
not necessary, appropriate, feasible, or in the
best interest of the parties,
(b) at the expiration of a period of time the
court may specifically designate, unless an appeal or other proceedings for review are pending,
or
(c) when the court, before the decree becomes
absolute, for sufficient cause otherwise orders
(2) The court, upon application or on its own motion for good cause shown, may waive, alter, or extend a designated period of time before the decree
becomes absolute, but not to exceed six months from
the signing and entry of the decree.
1W2
30-3-8. Remarriage — When unlawful.
Neither party to a divorce proceeding which dissolves their marriage by decree may marry any person other than the spouse from whom the divorce was
granted until it becomes absolute. If an appeal is
taken, the divorce is not absolute until after affirmance of the decree.
ivss

30-3-9.

Repealed.
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196s

30-3-10. Custody of c h i l d r e n in case of separation or divorce — Custody consideration.
(1) If a husband and wife having minor children
are separated, or their marriage is declared void or
dissolved, the court shall make an order for the future
care and custody of the minor children as it considers
appropriate In determining custody, the court shall
consider the best interests of the child and the past
conduct and demonstrated moral standards of each of
the parties The court may inquire of the children and
take into consideration the children's desires regarding the future custody, but the expressed desires are
not controlling and the court may determine the children's custody otherwise
(2) In awarding custody, the court shall consider,
among other factors the court finds relevant, which
parent is most likelv to act in the best interests of the
child including allowing the child frequent and con
tinuing contact with the noncustodial parent a.s the
court finds appropriate
(3) If the court finds t h a t one p a r e n t does not desire
custody of t h e child, or h a s a t t e m p t e d to p e r m a n e n t l y
relinquish custody to a third party, it shall t a k e t h a t
evidence into consideration in d e t e r m i n i n g whether
to a w a r d custody to t h e other p a r e n t
1993
30-3-10.1. J o i n t legal c u s t o d y defined.
In this chapter, "joint legal custody"
(1) means the sharing of the rights, pnv ileges,
duties and powers of a parent by both parent^
where specified,
(21 may include an award of exclusive authority by the court to one parent to make specific
decisions,
(3) does not affect the physical custodv of the
child except as specified in the order of joint legal
custody,
(4) is not based pn awarding equal or nearly
equal periods of physical custody of and access to
the child to each of the parents, as the best interest of the child often requires that a primary
physical residence for the child be designated,
and
(5) does not prohibit the court from specifying
one parent as the primary caretaker and one
home as the primary residence of the child
I<WH
30-3-10.2. J o i n t legal c u s t o d y o r d e r — F a c t o r s
for c o u r t d e t e r m i n a t i o n — Public assistance.
(1) The court may order joint legal custody if it
determines that joint legal custody is in the best
interest of the child and
(a) both parents agree to an order of joint legal
custody, or
(hi Iwth parents appear capable of implementing joint legal custody.
(2) In determining whether the best interest of a
child will be served by ordering joint custody, the
court shall consider the following factors(a) whether the physical, psychological, and
emotional needs and development of the child
will benefit from joint legal custody;
<b) the ability of the parents to give first priority to the welfare of the child and reach shared
decisions in the child's best interest,
(c) whether each parent is capable of encouraging and accepting a positive relationship between the child and the other parent,
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a successor is appointed and qualified. The presiding
judge of the Court of Appeals shall receive as additional compensation $1,000 per annum or fraction
thereof for the period served.
(2) The Court of Appeals shall sit and render judgment in panels of three judges. Assignment to panels
shall be by random rotation of all judges of the Court
o( Appeals The Court of Appeals by rule shall provide for the selection of a chaii for each panel. The
Court of Appeals may not sit en banc.
(3) The judges of the Court of Appeals shall elect a
presiding judge from among the members of the court
by majority vote of all judges. The term of office of the
presiding judge is two years and until a successor is
elected. A presiding judge of the Court of Appeals
may serve in that office no more than two successive
terms. The Court of Appeals may by rule provide for
an acting presiding judge to serve in the absence or
incapacity of the presiding judge
(4) The presiding judge may be removed from the
office of presiding judge by majority vote of all judges
of the Court of Appeals. In addition to the duties of a
judge of the Court of Appeals, the presiding judge
shall:
(a) administer the rotation and scheduling of
panels;
(b) act as liaison with the Supreme Court;
(c) call and preside over the meetings of the
Court of Appeals; and
(di carry out duties prescribed by the Supreme
Court and the- Judicial Council
<5) Filing fees for the Court of Appeals are the
same as for the Supreme Court
19K8

(h) appeals from the orders on petitions for extraordinary writs challenging the decisions of the
Board of Pardons except in cases involving a first
degree or capital felony;
(i) appeals from district court involving domestic relations cases, including, but not limited to,
divorce, annulment, property division, child custody, support, visitation, adoption, and paternity,
(j) appeals from the Utah Military Court; and
(k) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals
from the Supreme Court.
(3) The Court of Appeals upon its own motion only
and by the vote of four judges of the court may certify
to the Supreme Court for original appellate review
and determination any matter over which the Court
of Appeals has original appellate jurisdiction
(4) The Court of Appeals shall comply with the requirements of Title 63, Chapter 46b, in its review of
agency adjudicative proceedings
\w>

78-2a-3. C o u r t of Appeals j u r i s d i c t i o n .
(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue
all extraordinary writs and l<> i^sue all writs and process necessary.
(a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders,
and decrees; or
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction.
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction,
including jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, over:
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from
formal adjudicative proceedings of state agencies
or appeals from the district court review of informal adjudicative proceedings of the agencies, except the Public Service Commission, State Tax
Commission. Board of Stale Lands. Board of Oil,
Gas, and Mining, and the state engineer;
(b) appeals from the district court review of:
<i> adjudicative proceedings of agencies of
political subdivisions of the state or other local agencies; and
(ii) a challenge to agency action under
Section 63-46a-12.1;
(c) appeals from the juvenile courts;
(d) appeals from the circuit courts, except
those from the small claims department of a circuit court;
(e) interlocutory appeals from any court of
record in criminal cases, except those involving a
charge of a first degree or capital felony;
(0 appeals from a court of record in criminal
cases, except those involving a conviction of a
first degree or capital felony;
tg) appeals from orders on petitions for extraordinary writs sought by persons who are incarcerated or serving any other criminal sentence, except petitions constituting a challenge to
a conviction of or the sentence for a first deeree
or capital felony;

Section
78-3-1 to 78-3-2. Repealed.
78-3-3.
Term of judges — Vacancy.
78-3-4.
Jurisdiction — Transfer of cases to cir,
\ cuit court — Appeals — Jurisdiction
when circuit and district court
merged.
78-3-5.
Repealed.
78-3-6.
Terms — Minimum of once quarterly.
78-3-7 to 78-3-11. Repealed.
78-3-11.5.
State District Court Administrative
System.
78-3-12.
Repealed.
78-3-12.5.
Costs of system.
78-3-13.
Repealed.
78-3-13.4.
Counties joining court system — Procedure — Facilities — Salaries.
78-3-13.5, 78-3-14. Repealed.
78-3-14.5.
Allocation of district court fees and
fines.
78-3-15 to 78-3-17. Repealed.
78-3-17.5.
Application of savings accruing to
counties.
78-3-18.
Judicial Administration Act — Short
title.
78-3-19.
Purpose of act.
78-3-20.
Definitions.
78-3-21.
Judicial Council — Creation — Members — Terms and election — Responsibilities — Reports.
78-3-21.5.
Data bases for judicial boards.
78-3-22.
Presiding officer -— Compensation —
Duties.
78-3-23.
Administrator of the courts — Appointment — Qualifications — Salary.
78-3-24.
Court administrator — Powers, du-

78-2a~4. Review of a c t i o n s by S u p n - m e Court.
Review of the judgments, orders, and decrees of the
Court of Appeals shall be by petition for s\nt of certiorari to the Supreme Court.
IHWJ
78-2a-5. Location of C o u r t of A p p e a l s .
The Court of Appeals has its principal location in
Salt Lake City. The Court of Appeals may perform
any of its functions in any location within the state.
1986
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covery, were not prepared specifically for use in
and actually used in the ADR procedure.
«4) (a) A person providing ADR as defined in this
chapter is subject to the child abuse reporting
requirements of Section 62A-4-503 and the criminal penalty for failure to report under Section
62A-4-511. The confidentiality provisions of Section 62A-4-513 apply to reports made under this
subsection.
(b) If the ADR provider determines a participant in the procedure has made an immediate
threat of physical violence against a readily identifiable victim or against the provider, communications involving the threat are not confidential.
199!

78-31b-8. Liabilities of ADR p r o v i d e r .
Providers of ADR procedure services under this
chapter are immune from < nil liability for or resulting from any act or omission done or made while engaged in the ADR unless the act or omission was
made or done negligently, in bad faith, with malicious intent, or in a manner exhibiting a willful, wanton disregard of the rights, safety, or property of another.
1991
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78-32-1.
78-32-2.
7.S-32-3.

78-32-4.
78-32-5.
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78-32-7.
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78-32-9.
78-32-10.
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78-32-12.2.
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Acts and omissions constituting contempi.
Re-entry after eviction from real property
In immediate presence oi court; summary action — Without immediate
presence; procedure.
Warrant of attachment or commitment order to show cause.
Bail.
Duty of sheriff
Bail bond — Form.
OfTtcer's return.
Hearing.
Contempt — Action by court.
Damages to party aggrieved.
Imprisonment to compel performance.
Community service for violation of
visitation order or failure to pay
child support.
Definitions — Sanctions.
Pilot program — Purpose — Evaluation of pilot program — Exceptions.
Procedure when party charged fails to
appear.
Excuse for nonappearance — Unnecessary restraint forbidden.
Contempt of process of nonjudicial officer.
Procedure.

Acts and omissions c o n s t i t u t i n g contempt.
The following acts or omissions in respect to a court
or proceedings therein are contempts of the authority
of the court:
(1) Disorderly, contemptuous or insolent behavior toward the judge while holding the court,
tending to interrupt the due course of a trial or
other judicial proceeding.

78-32-3

(2) Breach of the peace, boisterous conduct or
violent disturbance, tending to interrupt the due
course of a trial or other judicial proceeding
(3) Misbehavior in office, or other willful neglect or violation of duty by an attorney, counsel,
clerk sheriff, or other person appointed or
elected to perform a judicial or ministerial service.
(4) Deceit, or abuse of the process or proceed
ings of the court. b> a party to an action or spe
cial proceeding
f5) Disobedience of any lawful judgment, order
or process of the court
<6i Assuming to be an officer, attorney or
counselor of a court, and acting as such without
author it\
(7) Rescuing any person or property in the custody of an officer by virtue of an order or process
of such com t
(8l Unl.iwluIU detaining a witness oi pait\ to
an action while going to, remaining at, or returning from, the court where the action is on the
calendar for trial
(9» Any other unlawful interference with the
process or proceedings of a court.
<10) Disobedience of a subpoena duly served.
or refusing to be sworn or to answer as a witness
(11) When summoned as a juror in a court, neglecting to attend or serve as such, or improperU
conversing with a party to an action to be tried at
Mi'-?, i :*' <•' 'A''h an% other person concern'":'
the merits ol such action, or receiving a communication from a party or other person in respect
to it. without immediately disclosing the same to
the court
<12> Disobedience by an inferior tribunal,
magistrate or officer of the lawful judgment, order or process of a superior court, or proceeding
in an action or special proceeding contrary to
law, after such action or special proceeding is removed from the jurisdiction of such inferior tribunal, magistrate or officer. Disobedience of the
lawful orders or process of a judicial officer is also
a contempt of the authority of such officer.
I»S:I
78-32-2.

Re-entry after eviction from real p r o p erty.
Every person dispossessed of. or ejected from or out
of. any real projM'rty bv the judgment or process of
any court of competent jurisdiction, who. not having a
right so to do. re-enters into or upon, or takes possession of. any such real projwrty. or induces or procures
any person, not having the right so to do. or aids or
abets him therein, is guilty of a contempt of the court
by winch such judgment was rendered, or from which
such process issued. Upon a conviction for such contempt the court must immediately issue an alias process, directed to the proper officer, requiring him to
restore such possession to the party entitled thereto
under the original judgment or process
ISM
78-32-3.

In i m m e d i a t e p r e s e n c e of c o u r t ; summ a r y action — Without i m m e d i a t e
presence; procedure.
When a contempt is committed in the immediate
view and presence of the court, or judge at chambers,
it may be punished summarily, for which an order
must be made, reciting the facts as occurring in such
immediate view and presence, adjudging that the person proceeded against is thereby guilty of a contempt,
and that he be punished as prescribed in Section
78-32-10 hereof. When the contempt is not committed

